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Introduction
Until now, virtually no attention has been given
by agricultural policy-makers in industrial coun-
tries to any strategies beyond present agri-indus-
trial preoccupations. More capital intensity, less
labour, more chemicals, larger units, more factory
farming are considered the only rational paths to
producing more food. These trends are assumed
by agricultural officialdom to be sustainable not
only in Britain but throughout the Buropean
Community, to whose central agricultural policy
Britain is financially and legally bound. But are
they sustainableor even now desirablein the
face of rising capital and oil and chemical input
costs and a general trend towards structural in-
dustrial unemployment?
The answer to these questions go far beyond the
concerns of economic efficiency on the farm into
issues of rural strategy of the sort which are now
agreed to be central to development studies but
peripheral to developed country strategy. In many
Third World countries the rise of the modern
sector has increased the stagnation of the country-
side as mass migration from the sluggish tradi-
tional sector contributed to the phenomenon of
rapid urbanisation. Planners have accordingly
devoted themselves to devising strategies for rural
revival and the injection of modern management,
machinery and science into the traditional sector.
Few have so far considered the possibility that
the 'backward areas' of the advanced countries
may have some of the same characteristics and
needs. Rich nations no longer have dual econo-
mies as, with an abundance of capital, every
economic activity has long since been modern-
ised. In the transition to post-industrialism, how-
ever, it may be necessary to permit, or even
encourage, a new dualism, with two types of
policy; one for the 'modern' sector and another
for industry and agriculture in 'backward' rural
regions. A point of departure for testing such
possibilities may present itself in Britain.
The industrial view of flritish agriculture
Britain launched her industrial revolution on the
wealth of a prosperous agriculture. In a century
of free trade and imperial-industrial expansion
(1846-1947) the country naturally preferred cheap
imported food.
At first this helped make British industrial goods
more competitive. But in the imperial phase fol-
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lowing the 1 880s, it subsidised low industrial pro-
ductivity. In the post-imperial period that began
in 1947 with the Labour government's agricultural
support system, the aim was to secure farm prices
that would make agriculture more productive
and at the same time more attractive to capital
investments. From the late 1950s British farming
was kept 'efficient' by the Treasury's insistence
that the government's guarantee prices increased
each year by slightly less than costs had risen in
the preceding twelve months. So farmers had
to grow a little more each year in order to earn
the same return.
The post war British farm subsidy system brought
an industrial phase in agriculture which had
scarcely started in the l920s and 1930s. (In 1920
there were only 10,000 farm tractors in Great
Britain compared with about 0.5 mn. today.)
(Leach, 1976:15) Larger farm units and more
capital intensive and labour economising methods
remain central to the British government's pro-
gramme. Their reasons are orthodoxly neoclassical:
this represents the best employment of British re-
sources. By increasing the import of new materials
such as fertilisers and foodgrains we may increase
the output of more expensive food items such
as livestock products from non-ruminants. From
ai accounting viewpoint this shows an an increase
in added value, and thus a higher proportion
of the total cost of our food contributed by the
home industry. (Ministry of Agriculture, Cmnd
6020).
The assumption is that we can always obtain
more food by trading competitively with other
nations. Suggestions that agriculture should have
priority because there may be absolute world
food shortages in the future and Britain may not
be able to sell sufficient industrial goods or ser-
vices to buy enough food or agricultural raw
materials, are not yet officially considered rele-
vant. They therefore tend to meet the response
that nationally, agricultural output contributes
no more than 3-4 per cent of GDP and must be
considered accordingly. (South East Joint Plan-
ning Team, 1970:4.18).
The assumption is thus made that agricultural
productivity can continue to be raised by modern
techniques under which "the farm of the future
is likely to resemble a minor industrial complex,
and the old pattern of hedge, field and copse may
be replaced. . . . by extensive areas of bare
croplands" (South East Joint Planning Team
1970:4.17). The present position as stated in the
government White Paper Land (White Paper
Cmnd. 5730) is that good agricultural land
(although preferably not of grades 1, 2 or 3) may
continue to be paved over for 'green field' devel-
opment, and indeed this is happening at an im-
pressive pace. During the remaining years of this
century, the demand for space for urban land
in Britain is currently estimated to be about 12,000
hectares per year, but could be as high as 23,000.
In addition, projections for new afforestation call
for 35,000 hectares of land a year, and some
economists urge that this rate of expansion be
increased, perhaps to 100,000 per year. Reservoirs,
mining, recreation etc. will demand about 5,000
hectares a year more and the need for additional
nature reserves could call for a further 4,000
hectares a year (Centre for Agricutural Strategy,
1976). Despite these potentially massive demands,
however, the major conflicts that worry subscribers
to the free trade views of agriculture are between
competing claims for 'more efficient' (i.e. more
market competitive) industrial farming and the
demand of urban population for rural amenity.'
An alternative strategy
Against this conventional wisdom there is now
a growing body of opinion which sees an alterna-
tive strategy for agriculture in a society apparent-
ly in transition from the present 'raw' industrial
phase to a more mature (and probably slower)
phase of economic growth. Indeed, if we seek
greater output, further progress in the present
direction may prove very expensive. It is instruc-
tive in this regard to compare agricultural input
costs and output for the nine members of the
European Community :2 In Belgium, for example,
wheat yields are about 14 per cent higher than
in Britain, barley + 16 per cent, oats +4 per cent,
sugar beet +26 per cent, fodder beet +60 per
cent, potatoes 4 per cent and livestock produce
generally + 13 per cent. To achieve this, feeding-
stuffs per hectare of farmed land cost 25 per cent
more than they do here, fertilizers and lime + 209
per cent, there are 61 per cent more tractors and-
interestingly-83 per cent more workers (per ha.)
(EEC, 1974). The country most like the UK in its
agricultural structure is West Germany, but even
there, slightly higher output per hectare is achieved
1 For a detailed discussion and justification of this view sec
Fairbrother, 1970.
2 The percentage comparisons of EEC yields are based on
yields/ha of the commodities concerned, in a single year.
Comparisons of input costs are highly aggregated, but they
are calculated on the same basis for each country and while
it is not possible to make very accurate or detailed comparisons,
it is possible to gain a general impression.
at disproportionately higher input costsand the
labour force is 133 per cent higher.
From such figures as these one may conclude
that whatever strategy Britain seeks to follow it
is probable that we will need more workers on the
landeven if we increase still further our use of
capital-intensive techniques. However, if we
further intensify mechanisation and chemicalisa-
tion, the cost of doing so is almost certain to ex-
ceed the value of the increased production. We
could be rather more self-sufficient in food, but
all food would cost considerably more.
We may be compelled then, to consider more
sensitive farming techniques. Such techniques
might increase output, but at a lower cost, making
organic farming and other, similar approaches,
worthy of closer consideration. To some extent
a move in this direction has already begun. The
livestock industry has rationalised the incompati-
bility of dairy and beef animals by a compromise
using specially developed all-purpose breeds: the
ubiquitous Friesian-Hereford cross is typical. The
cows are good milkers and the male calves can
be raised for good quality beef. The logical out-
come will be the disappearance of the specialist
'dairy' and 'beef' herds as such in favour of a
much more flexible general herd.
Work is now also very advanced on finding
alternatives to nitrogen fertilisers. The latter are
very expensive because their price is linked directly
to fossil fuel prices, and because they are so mobile
in the environment that it is virtually impossible
to use them without massive wastage. It would
help, if they were applied more carefully, with
doses varied from one part of a field to another to
allow for different requirements. But it may be
better to use innoculated cultures of free-living
nitrogen-fixing bacteria, or to develop plant
varieties capable of fixing nitrogen for themselves
(this essentially biochemical approach carries
genetic risks, but it is being developed anyway).
The approach to pesticide use is becoming equally
subtleamong scientists, at least, if not yet among
farmers.
Two other recent developments in thinking could
also point in the direction of an alternative to
Britain's present large unit, capital intensive in-
dustrial strategy for agriculture. The Capital
Transfer Tax (CTT) will, if retained, break up
large private landholdings within a generation.
It could greatly increase the number of small
holdings obtainable. However, the smaller unit
potential incidence of the CTT works against the
larger unit strategy of the Common Agricultural
Policy of the European Community, and of
British farming policy generally. Moreover, unless
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related to specific measures to encourage small
holdings, the likely effect of CTT is simply to
transfer large landholdings from individuals to
financial institutions.
The other new development is the rise of interest
in organic methods of farming. Most knowledge
of organic methods has so far been retained or
developed by voluntary bodies and individuals.
Virtually no official resources have been devoted
to it, beyond a small amount of university sup-
port. Yet one of the few really rigorous compari-
Sons that has been made in recent years between
organic and conventional farmers (Lockeretz et
al, 1975 and 1976) showed that, by using only
the nutrients available in materials on the farm,
organic farmers were able to sustain yields not
much lower than those of farmers using orthodox
artificial fertilizers. Even more important, they
did so at substantially lower unit production costs,
and with an energy consumption of about one
third that of conventional farmers. Partly as a
result of this study, and of the subjective findings
of British organic farmers, some leading agrono-
mists in this country foresee a gradual conversion
to organic methods as being possible without
major adverse effects on food output (Mellanby
1975). All the above considerations suggest an
alternative strategy to that of the conventional
wisdom for an advanced industrial economy.
An alternative strategy might have four major
objectives. First and foremost is a genuine increase
in the extent of national self-sufficiency. The
long range target here would be much greater
self-sufficiency in the entire chain of food pro-
duction involving not only lower imports of wheat
(now over SO per cent) sugar (over 60 per cent)
beef and veal (23 per cent) concentrated feed
stuffs for livestock (72 per cent) but also fertilizers
over 80 per cent) and energy required to work
farms and distribute farm inputs and products.
A subsidiary goal which is attracting increasing
interest is the aim of greater self-sufficiency at
the regional level. To achieve optimum regional
self-sufficiency within Britain economies are
needed, particularly in distribution and related
energy costs.
The third objective of this alternative strategy
is labour absorption. This goal calls for a pattern
of agriculture that is not less mechanised in terms
of substituting mhscle power for machines, but
employs more people as a result of a shift to
smaller management and operational units de-
signed to give greater productivity per hectare.
A fourth objective relates to health. It seeks an
improved national diet through an overall reduc-
tion in meat consumption and greater direct
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consumption of protein in the form of wholemeal
bread and other grains. These four goals are
reviewed briefly below.
The target of greater self-sufficiency
To aim at something close to national self-suffi-
ciency in food inputs is an ambitious target for
a country that currently imports 45 per cent of its
fôod. Greater self-sufficiency in food production
is, however, already an official goal of the Minis-
try of Agriculture, though the means by which
this is supposed to be achieved indicates concern
only with 'first order' sufficiency (i.e. excluding
consideration of reduced reliance on essential
imported inputs). The reasons for a target of
greater (it could not be complete) first and second
order self-sufficiency (i.e. including energy and
chemical imports) are multiple and inter-
connected.
First, of course, is the strategic concern over the
prospect that an ultra industrialised country with
consistently lagging productivity and foreign ex-
change problems may not be able to buy sufficient
food and agricultural raw materials in times of
world food crisis and very adverse terms of trade.
The theory of comparative advantage does not
admit to this as a rational problem, as it excludes
non-economic (e.g. political) considerations which
may affect productivity as well as the security
of external supply. An extension of calculations
to include future output and trade uncertainties
which stem from non-economic causes, however,
returns us to concepts which give priority in
certain sections to national production, often
pejoratively dismissed by free traders, as neo-
mercantilism. Additional arguments for greater
agricultural self-sufficiency emerge from the other
goals of an alternative strategy.
A framework of regional re-integration
A strategy of regional self-sufficiency within the
context of this target recognises that no sub-
national region can achieve anything approaching
self-sufficiency. But it claims major advantages
involving greater food supply security due to
reduced regional specialisation in the face of
increasingly erratic weather and industrial re-
lations, and escalating social and economic costs
of agricultural transport. For oxample, each
million British families currently require 3.4 mn.
ton-miles of transport for meat products alone
each year (Allaby, 1976:193-205).
One of the principal effects of the post-1947
subsidy for more mechanised farming was in-
creased farm specialisation. The traditional mixed
farm where every kind of livestock was supported
by arable and grassland areas that grew a range
of crops was all but killed off in the 1950s and
1 960s. Livestock farms specialised, often by taking
animals or poultry through just one stage of
growth, with stock changing hands two or three
times before slaughter. Arable-only farmers
became dependent on chemical fertiliser, while
manure accumulated on stock farms presented
a disposal or pollution problem.
This 'efficient' system produced cheap and more
luxurious converted-protein food until the grain
shortage of 1973, the oil crisis of 1973-74 and
the fertilizer crisis of 1974-75 all demonstrated
that in conditions of scarce imported feedstuffs,
sky-high fertilizer and rising oil costs, Britain was
heavily overstocked with animals, and that arable
farms were producing more than the land was
able to yield safely and continuously, without
the return of organic matter and fallow periods.
An alternative strategy would move back towards
mixed farming and reduce intensive indoor
rearing of non-ruminants. Grain now fed to
poultry (conversion efficiency 13 per cent) and
pigs (17 per cent) would be eaten directly by
humans. As pigs and poultry provide about a
third of our animal protein, the actual protein
in our diet could be increased in this way by 5
or 6 per cent. Pigs and poultry would increasingly
return to their marginal waste food consuming
role on farmsfeeding on spilled grain, scraps,
roots etc. while fertilising the ground. At the
same time the phasing out of the beef-only herd
would remove the need for grain imports.
Elimination of the beef-only herd would release
grassland as well as grain. This land could be
used to support a larger dairy herd whose surplus
male animals provide beef and veal. The increased
dairy output would reduce the need to import
butter and cheese, and its wastes could be fed to
pigs and poultry to supplement their diet. Mean-
while a reduction in our sugar consumption-
strongly advised to prevent a whole range of
degenerative diseaseswould mean that with
somewhat expanded beet production, we could
be close to self-sufficiency in sugar.
As regards fertilizer, Britain is capable of self-
sufficiency in potash but cannot avoid importing
phosphates, though some can be re-captured from
sewage while a substantial further saving could
be made by eliminating them from detergents.
In the case of nitrogen fertilizer, greater use of
organic material together with the chemical nitro-
gen fertiliser would save substantially on the
present 50 per cent loss of artificial nitrogen ferti-
liser through leeching. Meanwhile more general
use of nitrogen-fixing legumes (peas, beans of all
kinds, and clovers) would help to save further
on chemically-fixed nitrogen.
3. Less energy, more care = more employment,
higher food prices
There is today widespread recognition that a large
part of the chemical farming pollution problem
arises from standardised and heavy-handed 'slosh-
-it-on' practices, which waste fertilizer and pro-
duce run-off pollution while showing diminishing
returns in yield. If British agriculture is to make
the most efficient use of available nutrients, the
precise requirements must be provided for each
small area of land. This will require a substantial
increase in the farm labour force. Just what in-
crease in employment for what reduction of
pollution and cost saving is a matter for detailed
research and calculation, but the employment
trend of such practices seems clear. At the French
level of 11.5 per cent of the working population
in agriculture, Britain would need some 2 mn
instead of the present level of about 0.5 mn
working on the land.
In a complete reversal of the strategy of the
CAP, farms, or at least farm management units,
would become smaller rather than larger, as with
very intensive management the administrative
costs and difficulties would mount with the size
of unit. It seems unlikely, in fact, that the CAP
policy of amalgamating small farms can succeed
in achieving its objectives. So far the governments
operating the CAP have only succeeded in elimin-
ating the small-holding peasant farmer by
squeezing him out economically (at great cost),
though generally the policy of buying the small
man out has failed. Besides, landless ex-peasants
not only need new housing but employment in
a Community where industrial unemployment
appears endemic.
At the same time the need for smaller farm units
in the future may arise from purely logistic con-
siderations. The need for ease of access and per-
sonal involvement in day-by-day management
decisions will tend to favour smaller scale man-
agement, provided that the quality is high enough.
Social and psychic benefits may well arise from
allowing more people to control the land and
the production of food from it.
The process of return to smaller units may also
encourage a more diversified farming pattern.
Despite economic pressures, the personal pre-
ferences of farmers still affect their practices to
quite a large extent. Farmers grow wheat rather
than dairy farm simply on the basis of personal
preference. Also, in a landscape composed of a
larger number of units, it is likely that a larger
number of autonomous managers will choose
different specialities. Moreover, if political de-
volution were to encourage more regional self-
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sufficiency, this diversification could be increased
still further. (On the other hand it might not:
farmers might all try to get rich by growing the
same items mainly for export.) The landscape
would also probably be richer and where this
kind of richness occurs, one is also likely to
find greater ecological stability. This may be a
rather minor consideration in Britain, but it could
be a major one elsewhere in Europe or in tropical
areas, if it reduces the impact of crop diseases or
pest infestations by reducing the size of the target
crops.
The new agricultural worker required to replenish
the workforce of smaller, more labour-consuming
farms would have to be recruited from the in-
dustrially unemployed. He or she would require
substantial retraining; and would need to be
literate and competent to use mçre sophisticated
equipment and techniques than most that are
employed by today's agri-industrial workers.
In order to achieve a flow of labour back to the
land, the agricultural wage would have to become
comparable to that for factory work while work-
ing conditions, though inevitably quite different,
would have to be comparable in amenity to
those of the industrial production-line worker.
All this would mean further rises in food prices
which in turn would mean that food subsidies
would have to be increased.
Higher levels of employment in agriculture are
not likely to be achieved under the present pattern
of farming. As Kenneth Mellanby has pointed
out recently (Mellanby, 1977), completely arable
farms could probably never again employ large
numbers of workers. In the first place a large
part of the 19th and early 20th century farm
labour force was engaged exclusively in the care
and maintenance of horses. Cost and incon-
venience rule out the return of the horse as an
important draught animal. Also, as work on
arable-only farms is seasonal, farmers could not
afford to keep their labour force confined to
tasks such as hedging and ditching. On the other
hand, many arable farmers who would like to
keep stock again, believing that this would benefit
their soil, but cannot afford to do so, would be
encouraged by the 'post-industrial' strategy advo-
cated here. Abandoment of the 'feed-lot' beef
herd and a strategy of more dairy herds, could,
indeed, help to raise the employment potential
by diversification. Beyond this, however, is the
possibility of returning to a mixture of seasonal
agricultural work with rural industrial employ-
ment.
An increase in rural employment would relieve
pressure on urban housing and revive the build-
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ing industry in rural areas, with infilling develop-
ment in existing villages and small towns. Stock-
men would still have to live on farms, but the
bulk of agricultural workers would probably be
accommodated in towns and villages, shopping
facilities and amenities would expand with the
influx and a new stimulus would be given to
locate small, agriculture-related industries in
formerly stagnant small communities.
The introduction of policies to encourage such
trends in agriculture could help to trigger a pro-
cess of decentralisation which would involve far
more than the agricultural sector. It would rep-
resent a step towards what Stapledon (1972,
ch II) in the 1930s called "industrialising the
rural", the aim being to achieve an organic re-
integration of urban and rural life-styles lost in
the era of urban industrialism.
Rural industrialism became a major focus of
interest amid the aparently endemic US unem-
ployment of the 1930sonly to be eclipsed by
the industrial expansion which accompanied re-
armament and the war economy. By the early
l930s, American decentralists and proponents of
'small is beautiful'Mumford, Woods and Stuart
Chase in particular, were being joined by promi-
nent establishment figures who believed that the
stalling of the nation's industrial machine and its
apparent overcapacity was due to the massive
size of the new mass production plants. After a
few years of the depression, Henry Ford himself
pronounced that 500 to 1,000 men in a single
factory was enough. He also believed in industrial
dispersion: "The belief that our industrial country
has to concentrate its industry is not well-
founded", he wrote. Certainly smaller businesses
did relatively well in the United States in the
depressed 1930s.
The stimulus behind American decentralism at
the time was agricultural depression and over-
production, alongside massive unemployment in
highly centralised and integrated industry. "The
fundamental social objective of rural industry",
wrote Woods, "is to reduce the worker's depen-
dence on wages by providing the means to raise
food and affect other economies resulting from a
rural environment, aimed to alleviate, through
part-time factory employment, the predicament
of those living in agriculturally handicapped
areas" (Woods, 1939:231). By the mid-1930s 300
leaders from the fields of agriculture, industry and
science had produced a Declaration of De pen-
dence on the Soil and the Right to Self -Main-
tenance and started the Farm Chemurgie
Movement. They planned to produce alcohol in
great quantities from grains, molasses or potatoes
so as to supplement the nation's oil supply, while
Ford planned his soy bean car, declaring that
'much of an automobile can be grown on a
farm, much of it could be made from the by-
products of agriculture" (Woods, 1939) Ford
built a series of small plants in rural communities
where the bulk of the workforce was part-time
small-holding farmers.
4. An alternative strategy and improved nutrition
Much has been said and writen recently about
dietary contributions to the degenerative diseases
that have spread with affluence. Because of
market considerations, the question of improved
nutrition and healthier diet has never been linked
to official agricultural strategy. Here again one
sees in Britain how the new food consumption
patterns that now accompany low economic
growth are moving in the direction of a healthier
diet. The June, 1977, National Food Survey
shows how household consumption of sugar,
meat and butter (increasingly being substituted
by margarine on cost grounds) have been falling
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1977). It is arguable,
too, that a conversion from beef and pork to
more mutton and lamb consumption advocated
in this alternative strategy would favourably
reduce consumption of saturated fats, and thus
make a significant contribution to a reduction
in the incidence of cardiac and vascular diseases.
Post industrial agriculture's Third World impact
The parallel between the sort of decentralist-seif-
sufficient strategy outlined above and the World
Bank's and other aid agencies' strategies for de-
veloping countries scarcely requires remark. In
terms of its impact on poor countries, such a
strategy for a "post-industrial" country like
Britain could be either helpful or damaging
depending on what other policies accompanied
it, especially the type of aid. British self sufficiency
in food would not, however, have a significant
direct impact on Third World food and agri-
cultural input suppliers. Indeed, greater food out-
put by the UK can go a long way before it has
any effect at all on our trade with develop-
ing countries. Britain's main imports are of
temperate climate grains and high-value animal
products: a trade confined to rich industrial
countries. Its agricultural imports from the Third
World are made up mainly of sugar and vegetable
oils. Other imports, such as tea, coffee, cocoa,
tropical or sub-tropical fruits, etc. will obviously
not be affected. UK production of vegetable oil
could be increased by cropping oilseed rape.
Sugar remains the chief sore point. Here a com-
bination of reduced consumption and increased
beet acreage could reduce the import requirement
for cane sugar. In this case, though, one could
argue quite strongly for remaining dependent on
cane, because it is biologically far more efficient
than beet. Here Britainor the EECcould enter
into much more comprehensive agreements with
the cane producers in order to guarantee their
market, and also improve their cushioning against
the effects of the one-crop economy.
Finally, though not least significantly, a gradual
switch to this sort ef post-industrial strategy could
produce an impressive demonstration which could
be backed by more appropriate capital and techni-
cal assistance to pre-industrial economies which
would naturally arise from pursuing a more
parallel strategy in the rural sectors of both rich
and poor nations.
Conclusion: logic vs politics
To sum up, it seems that British agriculture,
despite its widespread reputation for efficiency,
has been the victim of crude policies and crude
technologies. These stemmed from the inevitable
desire of farmers and governments to reconcile
conflicting and competing demands. None of the
decisions is easy. In aiming for high yields of
wheat, for example, the protein content falls, so
the wheat is less "strong" and less suitable for
making the kind of spongy bread our baking
technologists insist that we like. However, grain
sold for breadmaking fetches a higher price than
grain sold for other uses. Which do you choose
to grow? The most valuable barley, sold for
malting, has a low protein content, but is difficult
to grow. If you aim for malting and miss, your
low-protein barley may be unacceptable for the
best quality feedgrain which requires a high pro-
tein content. The dairy cow is a milk-producing
machine that requires a skeleton just large enough
to accommodate the machinery and enough
muscle to hold the bones together. A beef animal
needs to grow large muscles quickly, and the
females of the breeds are almost worthless as
dairy animals. And so it goes on.
At present, the choices remain in a part-market
part-planned limbo. They are uncoordinated with
other, larger objectives of national social and
economic policy. This paper proposes that agri-
cultural policy evolve in future within an overall
context of post-industrial national development.
The political barriers to a rational post-industrial
evolution are, however, impressive. The CAP of
the European Community is antithetical to almost
every new direction advocated here: yet its sur-
vival, unreformed, is still held by many to be
the lynch pin of the survival of the Community
itself. The shift of employment from urban centres
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would have to be a large onewith very great
attendant problemsto make a significant impact
on agricultural patterns and practices. Could
rural employment be made as attractive as urban,
and what would this, again, entail in a shift of
resources? At the expense of what other objectives
could food prices be further subsidised?
These questionsand many othersmust be
answered before any alternative post-industrial
strategy for agriculture can be developed further.
What is required is an alternative modelor
series of models which test versions of the
thesis presented here. The new directions seem
intuitively to be mutually supporting. The extent
to which they may be so in reality, and the in-
stitutional and political implications of such a
new direction, should be the focus of further
work.
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